Market AnalysisDeep Dive (Vale)
A Flipkart delivery rider on a scooter trailing an invoice that unrolls far down a Bengaluru street, past a shopkeeper whose ledger shows a modest column of coins

Flipkart's Delivery Bill Took Most of Its Margin Gain

Flipkart's first group accounts filed in India show the adjusted operating loss down 17%, on higher gross margins and flat payroll. The bill for moving and storing goods rose 29%, against 23% for gross margin, and took most of the margin's gain in rupees, while borrowings more than doubled and the net loss barely moved.

Neritus Vale

Flipkart’s first consolidated accounts as an Indian-domiciled group show a repair that is real and stops short. By the company’s own measure, its adjusted operating loss fell 17% in the year to March 2026, helped by higher gross margins and lower overheads. Over the same year the bill for moving and storing goods rose 29%, Inc42 reports, faster in percentage terms than the margin that has to pay it. Below the operating line, most of the gain disappeared.

The accounts belong to Flipkart Internet Private Limited, which the group’s businesses moved under when Flipkart brought its domicile home from Singapore. Revenue rose 18%, to ₹1,45,880 crore. Flipkart’s results post defines its terms, and they are plainer than “adjusted” suggests. The operating loss is the loss before finance costs, other income, exceptional items and tax. Gross margin is revenue less purchases of goods for resale and the change in inventory.

Flipkart’s explanation for why so little reached the bottom line, as Inc42 reported it, was higher finance costs, deferred tax assets written off and one-off items. Together they held the net loss to a 2.1% improvement. Part of that is an accident of the base year: Business Standard, reading the filing itself, found that FY25 included a one-time ₹524 crore gain from reversing a tax provision.

The part of the shortfall that will recur is interest. Finance costs nearly doubled, to ₹1,209 crore. Unlike a write-off, that charge returns every year the debt stays. On our arithmetic, the increase alone ate about a third of the operating gain.

The same filing shows cash used in operations up by three-fifths, to ₹6,525 crore, while the operating loss narrowed. No fresh equity came in to cover it. Borrowings more than doubled.

Inside the operating line, the repair has two visible sources. Gross margin grew 23%, by Flipkart’s count. Advertising probably contributed: Flipkart Ads grew 31%, faster than revenue, and ad income carries almost no cost of goods.

The costs Flipkart held are the ones head office controls. Payroll barely moved, and other expenses outside logistics rose about 4%, on our arithmetic. Both grew far more slowly than revenue, which is how we read “lower overheads” in Flipkart’s post.

The cost Flipkart did not hold is the one that moves the goods. Logistics and storage charges reached ₹15,154 crore. Consolidation normally cancels charges between a group’s own companies, so on our reading this line records what the group pays outsiders to carry and store goods. On our count, it took about 86% of the year’s growth in other expenses.

Flipkart’s post credits “lower overheads” for the improvement and does not mention logistics, the fastest-growing cost among those reported.

In rupees, the bill took most of the margin’s gain without exceeding it. On our arithmetic from FY25 revenue and purchases, gross margin rose about ₹5,300 crore, against a ₹3,395 crore rise in logistics and storage charges.

Flipkart’s gross margin leaves the delivery bill out. The company says the gain reflects “improved unit economics”, but its footnote stops the unit at the cost of the goods. Walmart, which consolidates Flipkart, counts the cost of transporting merchandise to customers in cost of sales, though it books most distribution-facility warehousing in operating expenses. Walmart’s finance chief, John David Rainey, said in August 2025 that the international gross profit rate had fallen partly on “strategic investments in price across markets and our quick commerce capabilities in India”. On our reading, any delivery cost behind that fall would sit in Flipkart’s logistics line, not its gross margin.

The obvious suspect is Flipkart Minutes, the quick-commerce service, and the timing fits. On the same call, Walmart International chief Kathryn McLay counted 300 Minutes hubs, built to place “third-party inventory” closer to the consumer. Flipkart executives put the network at 750 by March 2026, Outlook Business reported, so it added at least 450 hubs inside the year these accounts cover.

The filing cannot confirm that Minutes is the cause. None of the reported figures splits logistics by business, and Flipkart publishes hub counts and growth multiples for Minutes, not costs. Myntra’s 30-minute M-Now is the weaker candidate: McLay counted 60 Myntra hubs on the same call, a fraction of the Minutes network.

Myntra’s own accounts show why the standalone numbers mislead. Its reported revenue fell on far less logistics income, while revenue excluding logistics rose 12%, Business Standard reports. It still swung to a loss, which includes a ₹137.5 crore write-off of deferred tax assets. Sharon Pais, Myntra’s head, said the group accounts are now “the accurate reflection” of performance across entities, Myntra included.

The strongest objection is that this is what building looks like. A hub costs money from the day it opens, and each order gets cheaper to deliver as the hub fills. If that holds, FY26 shows the costly first stretch of a build, and logistics will grow more slowly than revenue once the network is built. The objection needs one condition: the expansion has to stop.

The expansion has not stopped. Flipkart has nearly 1,200 Minutes hubs and plans about 1,500 by year-end, Business Standard reports, double the 750 at which FY26 closed. If Minutes is not the cause, the bill is climbing in Flipkart’s older businesses, where the build-cycle defence does not apply.

That build now meets a reported deadline. Moneycontrol reported in May, as Outlook Business relayed, that Walmart wants Flipkart at EBITDA breakeven by the end of March 2027, ahead of any listing or pre-IPO round. The report cites one source. The disclosed margin of minus 5.4% implies, by our arithmetic, an operating loss near ₹7,900 crore, while the P&L lines in Business Standard point to about ₹7,700 crore, before depreciation and share-based pay are added back.

Flipkart has shown it can hold the costs it controls from head office. The one it has not held moves with every parcel, and Flipkart is still adding the hubs that may feed it. If that bill keeps growing faster than the margin, next year’s accounts will show which gave way: the build or the reported deadline.